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Abstract 
This study highlights some deficiencies of the stock markets’ risk legislation 
framework, and particularly the CESR (2010) guidelines. We show that the current 
legislative framework fails to offer incentives to financial management companies to 
invest in advanced models for more representative Value at Risk (VaR) estimations, 
and for this reason, in many cases conventional VaR models are applied. We use data 
from the DAX, CAC 40, FTSE, FTSEMIB and IBEX indices, and then we apply them 
to the widely accepted Delta Normal VaR model. The empirical findings show that the 
conventional VaR models not only fail to provide information for the upcoming 
financial crises, but also contribute to such phenomena as procyclicality and 
overreaction in the stock market. We suggest additional tests and we empirically show 
how these tests could reduce the procyclicality issue and promote a more sustainable 
investment environment. Even though this study is mainly focused on CESR (2010) 
guidelines, it could be useful for any similar legislative framework, such as the Basel 
Accords.  
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1. Introduction 
It is widely known that a robust financial system significantly contributes to economic 
growth (Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000)). In order to achieve this, one of the financial 
system’s primary roles is to efficiently allocate resources from savers to 
borrowers/enterprises and in order for the intermediation procedure to work efficiently, 
the financial system should allow risk to be shared (Allen, Chui, and Maddaloni 
(2004)). Therefore, a reliable risk measure is crucial for the financial system’s 
robustness and for economic growth.  
Value at Risk (VaR) is assumed to be the main risk estimation measure in the financial 
industry. Accurate VaR estimations have puzzled financial economists, scholars, 
practitioners and regulators over the last decades and that is why the financial literature 
is mainly focused on VaR modeling. However, even though many advanced 
econometric methodologies have been suggested for the estimation of systematic risk 
(Engle and Manganelli (2004), Liu and Tse (2015), Billio and Pelizzon (2000), Moussa, 
Kamdem and Terraza (2014), Zhang, Su, Song, Qiu, Xiao and Su (2017)), several 
financial crises emerged in the same period throughout the world (Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2008)). Why does this happen? 
Prominent scholars have noticed that the contemporary financial models use so 
complex equations that non-mathematicians find them incomprehensible (Fama 
(1995)), and that often these models appear to be torturing the data in order to confess 
the crime/accurate estimations (Ross (1993)). Some other scholars observe that the 
advanced models are not widely applied in the financial industry due to the 
aforementioned complexity issue and the increased implementation costs that these 
models involve (Vasileiou (2016)). Could some of the crises have been avoided if such 
advanced models were adopted and used in real life? Could some legislative 
interventions force UCITS companies to adopt models that produce more reliable and 
representative VaR estimations?   
In this paper we do not try to present a new model, but to stress some deficiencies of 
the legislative framework, particularly concerning the Committtee of European 
Securities Regulators Guidelines on Risk Measurement for UCITS1 (CESR (2010)). 
                                                          
1 Undertakings Collective Investment in Transferable Securities. 
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The legislative framework accepts that a variety of models exists for estimating VaR, 
and that each model has its own set of assumptions, advantages and drawbacks. The 
common models include the parametric or Variance Covariance or Delta Normal model 
(DNVaR model), the Historical Simulation model and the Monte Carlo Simulation 
model. As the CESR explains (CESR (2010), p. 28, Explanatory text 54) “…CESR is 
of the view that for a UCITS referring largely to financial derivatives presenting non-
linear risk features, the parametric VaR model is not appropriate and such a UCITS 
should rather refer to a Historical Simulation model or a Monte-Carlo model.”. For the 
purpose of this study, we will use the most capitalized European stock indices: the 
German DAX index, the French CAC 40 Index, the UK FTSE Index, the Italian 
FTSEMIB Index, and the Spanish IBEX Index. Therefore, without using derivatives 
we will examine our cases adopting the popular, easily applied and easily understood 
DNVaR model (Jorion (2007)).   
In this paragraph we briefly present the CESR (2010) requirements for risk 
management. According to the CESR (2010, p. 26), the VaR is estimated with the 
following parameters: (a) one-tailed confidence interval of 99%, and (b) effective 
observation period (history) of risk factors of at least 1 year (approximately 250 
business days) unless a shorter observation period is justified by a significant increase 
in price volatility (for instance extreme market conditions). The backtest of a VaR 
model is carried out at least on a monthly basis, and if the number of overshootings for 
each UCITS for the most recent 250 business days exceeds 4 at the 99% confidence 
level (c.l.) the VaR model should be reviewed and the appropriate adjustments should 
be made (CESR (2010), p. 29-30)2. The specific requirements present some deficiencies 
because it enables risk managers to avoid the cost of adopting advanced models: i.e. in 
practice, a UCITS may use a conservative and conventional VaR model and a relative 
VaR approach in order not to exceed the 4 out of the 250 observations limit without 
encountering any legal problems (Vasileiou (2016)). 
This study focuses on the models’ evaluation/backtests and their possible 
consequences. In practice, legislation is exclusively focused on the overshootings issue, 
                                                          
2 The Basel Accord suggests three zones of risk depending on the number of violations per 250 
observations: the Green zone (up to four violations-accurate model), the yellow zone (5 to 9 violations) 
and the red zone (more than 10 violations). Less than 4 violations mean the model is accurate. When 5 
or more violations are documented it means that there are some doubts regarding its reliability, so 
penalties are imposed; more than ten violations suggest that the model is completely inaccurate.  
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without examining whether the VaR estimations are representative of the real financial 
risk or whether they lead to overreactions and procyclical behavior in the stock market, 
thus leaving the financial system vulnerable to instability. Moreover, it shows that the 
more than a year observations limit does not offer anything to the financial system’s 
robustness. The scope of this paper is to reply to questions such as the above mentioned, 
to highlight deficiencies in the risk regulatory framework, and suggest some legislative 
adjustments that could contribute to more reliable VaR estimations and a more stable 
financial environment.    
The rest of the paper goes as following: Section 2 presents the theoretical framework 
and Section 3 empirically validates the study’s main assumptions. Section 4 further 
discusses the findings and shows how the VaR legislative framework is linked to the 
overreaction and the procyclical behavior of the stock markets. Section 5 concludes the 
study.   
 
2. Theoretical framework and Graphical Representation of the Data  
One of the mainstreams and most frequently used models for VaR estimation is the 
Delta Normal VaR model (DNVaR) or Variance-Covariance model (Jorion (2007), 
CESR (2010, p.28)). In practice, many UCITS companies, especially small and medium 
sized, adopt the DNVaR model because it is easily understood, and because of its low-
cost implementation (Vasileiou (2016)). 
The DNVaR model at the 99% confidence level (c.l.) is estimated as below 
 DNVaR =  (Expected change in portfolio/asset’s value) 
  -2.33×(Standard deviation of change in portfolio/asset value)   (1) 
In a daily process, the mean value (expected returns) is usually considered as zero, 
which is a reasonable assumption for a short holding period (Linsmeier and Pearson 
(2000), p. 53), so equation 1 turns to: 
DNVaR= -2.33 × (Standard deviation of change in portfolio/asset value)   (2) 
For the scope of this study, we adopt equation 2 which shows that the standard deviation 
significantly influences the VaR estimation; but is the 1-year standard deviation 
representative of the real financial risk? The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) 
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suggests that markets instantly adopt the information into their valuation process (Fama 
(1970)). Therefore, is the 250-day observation period appropriate for representative 
VaR estimations or does the increased number of observations lead to estimations that 
fail to instantly capture the financial trend?  
Vasileiou and Pantos (2018) examine the Historical VaR model when the 250-day 
observation period is used and they provide empirical evidence that the specific model 
fails to capture the financial trend. Hendricks (1996) suggests that the conventional VaR 
models that use fewer than 250 observations as inputs (almost a year) present 
estimations that are closer to the real financial risk conditions than the models that use 
more than 250 observations (longer-observation models), but they will suffer from 
many low-deviated overshootings.   
Therefore, when the stock market passes from a long-term growth period to a crisis 
period, the suggested lower limit of 250 observations leads to under-estimated VaRs 
that fail to notify the risk manager of the upcoming changes in time and any action that 
could be taken to rectify the situation is at this point ill-advised. The opposite holds 
when the stock market passes from a crisis period to a growth period. In such a case, 
the VaR will be much more conservative than the financial environment requires. This 
investment behavior may lead to procyclicality, which is a less explored issue 
(Youngman (2008), Adrian and Shin (2013)) than VaR modeling.  
The abovementioned cases are presented in Figure 1 using data from the DAX index, 
the CAC 40 Index, the FTSE Index, the FTSEMIB Index, and the IBEX Index for the 
period 2002-183. Each market is presented in sub-figures (a)-(e), respectively, and each 
sub-figure shows the index performance, the daily returns, and the 1-year Standard 
Deviation4.  We observe that when a recession/crisis period comes (points R) the s.d. is 
lower than when the market turns from recession to growth (points G). This is evidence 
that the DNVaR method (which is linearly correlated to the s.d., eq. 2) is backward-
looking, not representative of the real financial risk, and an indication that it may be a 
contributory factor to procyclicality. For each market, at point R, the model 
                                                          
3 We use the 2002-2018 period because in 2002 the Euro started to circulate as official currency in the 
Eurozone countries in our sample (all the sample countries except the UK) which is a significant 
structural change.  
4 We use a 20-day holding period (daily standard deviation multiplied by the square root of 20) in order 
to show more clearly in the graph (figure 1) that the conventional standard deviation is not an 
appropriate measure.  
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underestimates the risk, and therefore investors may panic, because the VaR estimation 
fails to reliably depict the real financial risk. However, after the crisis, point G, the VaR 
measure over-estimates the risk which may reduce the investor’s willingness for new 
investments, and this behavior may delay the recovery.  
The graphical representation shows that the popular DNVaR model (at least 1 Year of 
data observations) seems to be procyclical when it is evaluated based on current legal 
guidelines. In point R, the VaR should increase almost instantly to inform market 
participants that a crisis/recession is coming. After G, the VaR measure should be 
lower, because a growth period is coming. As figure 1 shows, the opposite signs are 
given, because the 250-observation period does not instantly capture the changing 
market trends. It is notable that the pattern is robust for all the examined samples, so 
the procyclicality issue of the VaR estimation under the legislative framework’s 
guidance seems to exist. Therefore, there are signs that the minimum requirement of 
250-day observations may lead to procyclical VaR estimations. Is there any test for the 
procyclicality issue? The reply, is no. However, there are backtesting provisions under 
the CESR (2010)), which are presented below.  
The regulatory framework does not examine at all the VaR estimations’ 
representativeness and procyclicality, because the backtesting procedure only examines 
the overshootings. This backtesting approach has the following deficiencies:  
i.e. assuming that method A provides a VaR estimation equal to 1%, when the 
actual losses are 2.5%, this estimation is less accurate than a 2.4% estimation 
calculated by method B. However, according to the legislative framework, 
both models present overshootings. We assume that there is another model C, 
which is much more conservative than models A and B, and its VaR estimation 
equals 4%. According to the legal guidelines, Model C is accurate in this case, 
no matter if the specific model over-estimates the risk. Therefore, we have to 
question whether or not it is representative.  
In an effective financial system the risk should be shared (Allen et al (2004)), and 
in order for the risk to be shared the VaR estimations should be representative. 
For a VaR model to be considered as representative and non-procyclical, its 
estimations should not under-estimate or over-estimate the risk.  
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Figure 1: Conventional VaR Procyclicality, Index Performance, Daily Returns 
and 1-Year Standard Deviation  
(a) Germany (DAX) 
 
(b) France (CAC 40) 
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(c) United Kingdom (FTSE) 
 
(d) Italy (FTSEMIB) 
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(e) Spain (IBEX) 
 
 
Vasileiou and Pantos (2018) observe that the current legislative backtesting 
procedure is similar to the binomial Kupiec test (1995) which examines the 
overshootings per a given period in order to conclude whether a model is accurate 
or not. However, the law requirement for VaR estimations at the 99% c.l. does 
not give the opportunity to examine if the VaR models overestimate the risk, 
which is also against the robustness of the financial system. Particularly, at the 
99% c.l. a model is evaluated as valid when 0-4 overshootings are observed 
during the last 250 trading days. When more than 4 violations are observed the 
model is considered as inaccurate because it underestimates the risk, but when a 
model over-estimates the risk at this c.l. no sign is given (we cannot have fewer 
than zero overshootings). Therefore, they suggest that a c.l. lower than 99% could 
be adopted. According to the Kupiec (1995) test at the 95% c.l., the accepted 
number of overshootings for 250 observations (approximately a year) is between 
[7,20]. More than 20 overshootings show that the model underestimates the risk, 
and less than 7 is an indicator that the model overestimates the risk.  
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In this study, we follow the same backtesting procedure as Vasileiou and Pantos (2018) 
in order to evaluate the models and to examine procyclicality (two backtests at 99% and 
95% c.l.). Furthermore, we present some simple statistics that could be added to the 
backtesting procedure in order to present how representative a VaR model is, even when 
the 99% c.l. is tested. Moreover, we test the DNVaR model using 250 or more 
observations (250-, 500- and 750-), and we also test the model using fewer observations 
than the legislative limit allows (20- and 125-). The reason is the following: the law 
requires at least a monthly backtesting of the VaR model. When a model is inaccurate, 
i.e. the observation period is not appropriate, the model should be revised. Therefore, 
what does the requirement of at least a 250-day observation period really offer? If the 
use of fewer than 250 observations is not appropriate, the observation period can be 
easily modified following the same procedure that is used to modify/revise longer-
observation periods of 250 or more observations. Theoretically, the contribution of a 
lower limit of observations towards financial stability is minor, but could this limitation 
have negative effects and lead to procyclical VaR estimations? In the next paragraph, 
we empirically test these issues.     
 
3. VaR estimations: what the Data Say?  
Table 1 presents the empirical results which provide an answer to our abovementioned 
queries. For each index we present the number of violations per year at the 99% c.l. and 
at the 95% c.l. When a model is considered as inaccurate the cell is shaded for the 
respective year5. The lower part of the tables, which is all shaded, shows some 
descriptive statistics for a more in-depth analysis that could easily be added to the 
backtesting procedure in order to test the models’ ability to represent the risk. The 
following measures are included in this part: 
- Inaccurate: number of years that the respective model is considered inaccurate, 
and needs revision. The lower the number the better the VaR model.  
- Mean: the mean value of the VaR estimations. As Vasileiou (2016) shows, 
under the CESR (2010) legislation the risk manager could apply a conservative 
VaR model and use the relative VaR. This way asset management companies 
                                                          
5 The violation ranges/areas are: at 99% more than four overshootings (four overshootings rule), at 95% 
the overshootings number should not be between 7 and 20.   
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would avoid the adoption of expensive, but accurate and representative VaR 
estimations programs that use advanced modeling. The lower the number, the 
less conservative the VaR model. 
- Standard Deviation: is the Standard Deviation of the estimated VaR models 
during the examined period. The higher this number is the more flexible the 
VaR model is considered (Hendricks (1996), Vasileiou (2017)).  
- Min-Max: is the Maximum and the Minimum values of the documented VaR 
estimation. It is supplementary to the Standard Deviation and the higher the 
Min-Max deviation is the more flexible the VaR model is considered. 
- MSE: is the Mean Square Error of the VaR estimations, which is the average 
squared difference between the estimated VaR minus the real returns. The lower 
this number is the more representative to the real data the VaR model is. 
-  Deviations when overshootings are observed (average): is the average value of 
the deviations between the VaR estimation and the losses when a deviation is 
observed. The lower this number is the closer to the real risk the VaR model is. 
As it has been mentioned, the legislative framework examines only the number 
of violations. This simple statistical measure could contribute to more 
representative VaR estimations, especially at the 99% c.l.. 
- The results are presented in Table 1 and the best values from each category, 
according to the above-mentioned criteria, are indicated with bold numbers. We 
analytically present the way the models were evaluated taking as a basic 
example the German stock market and the DAX Index6. The conclusions of the 
other examined cases are similar to those presented below for the German case.  
-  
 
  
                                                          
6 There is no specific reason as to why we present the German case. As the results show, we would 
reach similar conclusions if we were to choose any other market in our sample. 
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Table 1: Εvaluation of DNVaR models. 
A. Germany – DAX Index 
A1. Germany – DAX Index 99% c.l. 
 
  
20-day 
DNVaR 
125-day 
DNVaR 
250-day 
DNVaR 
500-day 
DNVaR 
750-day 
DNVaR 
2002 1 9 7 15 17 
2003 2 0 0 1 1 
2004 5 3 0 0 0 
2005 4 6 7 0 0 
2006 7 6 6 7 2 
2007 5 4 6 6 6 
2008 8 12 15 18 20 
2009 3 0 0 4 5 
2010 5 5 2 0 0 
2011 9 11 13 12 6 
2012 3 2 0 0 1 
2013 6 6 2 0 1 
2014 9 7 7 6 4 
2015 8 7 8 13 14 
2016 3 1 2 3 6 
2017 3 2 1 0 0 
2018 7 10 11 9 2 
Sum of Violations 88 91 87 94 85 
Inaccurate 10 10 9 8 7 
Mean -2.96% -3.11% -3.19% -3.31% -3.41% 
Standard  
Deviation 1.67% 1.44% 1.32% 1.09% 0.87% 
Min -12.32% -7.69% -6.82% -5.66% -5.04% 
Max -0.64% -1.43% -1.52% -1.82% -2.02% 
MSE 0.138% 0.140% 0.142% 0.145% 0.147% 
Deviations when 
overshootings are  
observed (average) -0.624% -0.763% -0.822% -0.974% -1.067% 
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A2. Germany – DAX Index 95% c.l. 
  
20-day 
DNVaR 
125-day 
DNVaR 
250-day 
DNVaR 
500-day 
DNVaR 
750-day 
DNVaR 
2002 21 22 22 28 33 
2003 10 5 4 9 11 
2004 19 9 7 0 0 
2005 13 10 12 7 0 
2006 21 18 20 21 14 
2007 16 15 17 14 20 
2008 20 23 27 36 39 
2009 15 5 5 10 13 
2010 16 11 8 0 3 
2011 23 25 29 30 15 
2012 11 6 4 5 6 
2013 13 14 10 3 5 
2014 22 21 21 18 8 
2015 18 17 22 26 28 
2016 12 9 9 14 15 
2017 12 10 8 0 0 
2018 24 24 30 28 11 
Sum of Violations 286 244 255 249 221 
Inaccurate 5 8 9 11 9 
Mean -2.10% -2.20% -2.26% -2.34% -2.41% 
Standard  
Deviation 1.18% 1.02% 0.93% 0.77% 0.62% 
Min -8.71% -5.44% -4.82% -4.00% -3.56% 
Max -0.46% -1.01% -1.08% -1.29% -1.43% 
MSE 0.080% 0.081% 0.082% 0.084% 0.085% 
Deviations when 
overshootings are  
observed (average) -0.633% -0.793% -0.789% -0.913% -1.011% 
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B. France – CAC 40 Index 
B1. France CAC 40 Index – 99% c.l. 
  
20-day 
DNVaR 
125-day 
DNVaR 
250-day 
DNVaR 
500-day 
DNVaR 
750-day 
DNVaR 
2002 2 11 8 15 17 
2003 3 1 0 1 1 
2004 8 5 4 0 0 
2005 5 5 4 1 0 
2006 5 6 7 7 7 
2007 5 6 8 9 11 
2008 5 11 14 20 22 
2009 4 1 0 0 4 
2010 9 6 5 0 2 
2011 6 10 11 10 6 
2012 5 0 0 0 0 
2013 7 4 3 0 1 
2014 9 7 7 7 3 
2015 5 5 8 12 12 
2016 4 2 3 4 5 
2017 3 2 1 0 0 
2018 11 10 9 8 1 
Sum of Violations 96 92 92 94 92 
Inaccurate 12 11 9 8 7 
Mean -2.89% -3.03% -3.11% -3.23% -3.31% 
Standard  
Deviation 1.64% 1.37% 1.24% 1.03% 0.82% 
Min -12.83% -7.96% -6.30% -5.11% -4.61% 
Max -0.59% -1.29% -1.52% -1.65% -1.88% 
MSE 0.131% 0.132% 0.133% 0.136% 0.138% 
Deviations when 
overshootings are  
observed (average) -0.629% -0.854% -0.911% -1.018% -1.061% 
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B2. France CAC 40 Index – 95% c.l. 
  
20-day 
DNVaR 
125-day 
DNVaR 
250-day 
DNVaR 
500-day 
DNVaR 
750-day 
DNVaR 
2002 15 20 21 24 26 
2003 12 5 3 6 8 
2004 15 11 9 0 0 
2005 12 11 11 6 0 
2006 17 12 14 17 15 
2007 18 20 23 23 25 
2008 24 22 28 40 47 
2009 16 2 4 7 12 
2010 19 16 16 5 6 
2011 18 22 23 19 14 
2012 14 9 3 9 9 
2013 15 11 8 5 5 
2014 19 18 16 12 7 
2015 16 16 19 23 23 
2016 14 6 9 11 13 
2017 10 7 4 0 0 
2018 21 25 27 22 10 
Sum of Violations 275 233 238 229 220 
Inaccurate 2 6 9 11 9 
Mean -2.05% -2.15% -2.20% -2.28% -2.34% 
Standard  
Deviation 1.16% 0.97% 0.87% 0.73% 0.58% 
Min -9.07% -5.63% -4.46% -3.61% -3.26% 
Max -0.42% -0.91% -1.08% -1.17% -1.33% 
MSE 0.076% 0.076% 0.077% 0.078% 0.079% 
Deviations when 
overshootings are  
observed (average) -0.657% -0.875% -0.875% -0.975% -1.032% 
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C. United Kingdom - FTSE 
C1. United Kingdom – FTSE 99% c.l.  
  
20-day 
DNVaR 
125-day 
DNVaR 
250-day 
DNVaR 
500-day 
DNVaR 
750-day 
DNVaR 
2002 5 11 11 13 13 
2003 3 1 1 1 2 
2004 6 4 4 0 0 
2005 7 6 4 2 0 
2006 5 6 8 11 9 
2007 8 8 12 11 16 
2008 7 10 13 20 25 
2009 3 1 0 2 2 
2010 9 6 6 0 0 
2011 7 9 8 7 2 
2012 6 1 0 0 0 
2013 8 4 4 1 1 
2014 11 10 7 5 4 
2015 8 8 9 13 13 
2016 4 2 3 7 7 
2017 4 2 2 1 1 
2018 9 8 9 6 4 
Sum of Violations 110 97 101 100 99 
Inaccurate 13 10 9 9 6 
Mean -2.33% -2.45% -2.51% -2.61% -2.69% 
Standard  
Deviation 1.41% 1.20% 1.09% 0.93% 0.77% 
Min -11.95% -7.27% -5.76% -4.71% -4.15% 
Max -0.54% -1.15% -1.18% -1.34% -1.50% 
MSE 0.088% 0.089% 0.089% 0.091% 0.093% 
Deviations when 
overshottings are  
observed (average) -0.503% -0.753% -0.749% -0.918% -0.976% 
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C2. United Kingdom – FTSE 95% c.l.  
  
20-day 
DNVaR 
125-day 
DNVaR 
250-day 
DNVaR 
500-day 
DNVaR 
750-day 
DNVaR 
2002 25 21 18 21 21 
2003 12 3 2 4 6 
2004 16 11 6 0 0 
2005 14 12 11 9 1 
2006 16 14 15 17 16 
2007 15 19 22 21 25 
2008 20 25 27 34 40 
2009 12 5 3 5 8 
2010 17 13 11 2 2 
2011 20 22 21 18 10 
2012 15 10 3 5 6 
2013 20 13 12 5 4 
2014 21 18 16 12 9 
2015 18 20 21 23 24 
2016 11 6 9 13 14 
2017 14 11 8 1 1 
2018 22 24 28 24 9 
Sum of Violations 288 247 233 214 196 
Inaccurate 3 7 9 12 11 
Mean -1.64% -1.73% -1.78% -1.84% -1.90% 
Standard  
Deviation 1.00% 0.85% 0.77% 0.66% 0.54% 
Min -8.45% -5.14% -4.07% -3.33% -2.93% 
Max -0.38% -0.82% -0.83% -0.94% -1.06% 
MSE 0.051% 0.051% 0.052% 0.052% 0.053% 
Deviations when 
overshootings are  
observed (average)  -0.553% -0.695% -0.779% -0.902% -0.982% 
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D. Italy – FTSEMIB Index 
D1. Italy – FTSEMIB Index 99% 
  
20-day 
DNVaR 
125-day 
DNVaR 
250-day 
DNVaR 
500-day 
DNVaR 
750-day 
DNVaR 
2002 2 5 3 5 7 
2003 4 0 0 0 0 
2004 6 4 3 0 0 
2005 8 6 7 5 0 
2006 6 6 6 8 6 
2007 8 10 12 11 14 
2008 9 12 16 24 26 
2009 6 1 4 5 8 
2010 9 6 4 1 2 
2011 6 13 15 13 7 
2012 2 3 0 3 3 
2013 6 2 2 1 2 
2014 7 5 4 3 2 
2015 5 4 4 5 4 
2016 4 4 4 4 6 
2017 5 1 0 0 0 
2018 9 7 11 4 2 
Sum of Violations 102 89 95 92 89 
Inaccurate 13 9 6 8 7 
Mean -3.14% -3.29% -3.36% -3.45% -3.50% 
Standard  
Deviation 1.66% 1.39% 1.25% 1.05% 0.87% 
Min -12.67% -7.92% -6.50% -5.35% -4.81% 
Max -0.71% -1.16% -1.36% -1.51% -1.65% 
MSE 0.149% 0.150% 0.152% 0.153% 0.154% 
Deviations when 
overshootings are  
observed (average)  -0.690% -0.911% -0.959% -1.108% -1.176% 
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D2. Italy – FTSEMIB Index 95% 
  
20-day 
DNVaR 
125-day 
DNVaR 
250-day 
DNVaR 
500-day 
DNVaR 
750-day 
DNVaR 
2002 17 17 14 20 21 
2003 14 6 3 6 7 
2004 12 10 6 0 0 
2005 14 16 16 8 4 
2006 15 15 19 20 16 
2007 16 22 23 23 24 
2008 29 24 33 43 50 
2009 18 8 7 11 15 
2010 22 18 13 5 10 
2011 19 27 31 29 21 
2012 15 8 6 11 11 
2013 13 12 9 3 6 
2014 15 16 18 14 9 
2015 19 15 13 18 18 
2016 15 10 14 16 19 
2017 16 6 1 1 1 
2018 20 22 29 21 6 
Sum of Violations 289 252 255 249 238 
Inaccurate 2 6 8 9 9 
Mean -2.22% -2.32% -2.37% -2.44% -2.48% 
Standard  
Deviation 1.17% 0.98% 0.88% 0.74% 0.61% 
Min -8.96% -5.60% -4.60% -3.78% -3.40% 
Max -0.50% -0.82% -0.96% -1.06% -1.17% 
MSE 0.086% 0.087% 0.087% 0.088% 0.088% 
Deviations when 
overshootings are  
observed (average)  -0.721% -0.865% -0.893% -0.982% -1.026% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Review of Economic Analysis, forthcoming, 12 (2020)
20 
 
E. Spain - IBEX Index 
E1. Spain – IBEX Index 99% 
  
20-day 
DNVaR 
125-day 
DNVaR 
250-day 
DNVaR 
500-day 
DNVaR 
750-day 
DNVaR 
2002 3 4 4 4 4 
2003 4 1 0 0 0 
2004 7 3 2 1 1 
2005 4 4 2 2 0 
2006 6 7 7 8 6 
2007 9 7 9 10 12 
2008 8 10 13 20 28 
2009 3 0 0 1 4 
2010 9 5 5 4 4 
2011 2 7 8 7 4 
2012 6 3 2 2 3 
2013 5 4 0 0 0 
2014 7 5 5 5 1 
2015 8 5 5 8 7 
2016 2 3 4 4 7 
2017 2 1 1 0 0 
2018 9 6 5 2 1 
Sum of Violations 94 75 72 78 82 
Inaccurate 10 8 8 6 5 
Mean -2.99% -3.15% -3.23% -3.33% -3.40% 
Standard  
Deviation 1.61% 1.31% 1.18% 1.00% 0.82% 
Min -12.63% -7.47% -6.03% -5.25% -4.82% 
Max -0.86% -1.33% -1.41% -1.49% -1.75% 
MSE 0.138% 0.139% 0.141% 0.144% 0.145% 
Deviations when 
overshootings are  
observed (average)  -0.749% -1.061% -1.157% -1.095% -1.115% 
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E2. Spain – IBEX Index 95% 
  
20-day 
DNVaR 
125-day 
DNVaR 
250-day 
DNVaR 
500-day 
DNVaR 
750-day 
DNVaR 
2002 9 12 12 14 18 
2003 12 5 2 3 3 
2004 13 8 6 1 1 
2005 14 11 8 6 0 
2006 13 12 13 15 12 
2007 17 13 13 19 19 
2008 20 19 27 37 45 
2009 16 4 2 6 8 
2010 20 17 15 7 7 
2011 17 19 18 14 11 
2012 14 16 10 12 14 
2013 13 9 4 4 4 
2014 16 18 17 11 7 
2015 19 12 17 21 17 
2016 16 9 13 14 17 
2017 15 8 4 1 1 
2018 25 19 17 14 6 
Sum of Violations 269 211 198 199 190 
Inaccurate 1 2 6 8 7 
Mean -2.11% -2.23% -2.28% -2.35% -2.40% 
Standard  
Deviation 
1.14% 0.93% 0.83% 0.70% 0.58% 
Min -8.93% -5.28% -4.27% -3.71% -3.41% 
Max -0.61% -0.94% -1.00% -1.05% -1.24% 
MSE 0.080% 0.081% 0.081% 0.083% 0.084% 
Deviations when 
overshootings are  
observed (average)  
-0.695% -0.899% -0.962% -1.005% -1.087% 
 
 
As the results show at the 99% c.l. the 750-day DNVaR is considered the most accurate 
because it is deemed inaccurate in only 7 backtests according to the four overshootings 
rule. If we examine the results more closely, we observe that the model is marginally 
inaccurate in 2007, 2009, 2011 and 2016, because in those years up to six overshootings 
per year were documented, which means that the modelling issue is not so severe. When 
the specific model presents significant accuracy issues such as in 2002, 2008 and 2015, 
the model should be revised using a shorter observation period, as the law suggests. 
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This way the financial risk is manageable and the asset management companies may 
avoid bearing the cost of adopting advanced models (Vasileiou (2016)).  
However, if we do not restrict our evaluation only to the number of overshootings, we 
observe that the specific version of the DNVaR model is the most conservative 
(compare the Mean values) and the less flexible to adopt the changes in the financial 
environment (compare Standard Deviations, Min, Max and MSE values). Finally, when 
overshootings are observed there are too many per year (20 in 2008, at the 99% c.l.) 
and highly deviated from the real losses (the VaR estimations fail on average 1.067% 
relative to the real losses per day). At the same confidence level, the 20-day DNVaR 
model even though it is considered inaccurate in 10 out of the 17 years, the statistics 
show that it is the most representative of the real financial risk amongst the examined. 
It is the least conservative, the most flexible to capture the real financial risk, it presents 
the lowest MSE, and when overshootings are observed the VaR estimations are closer 
to the real losses. However, according to the four overshootings rule this model is 
amongst the least accurate, because the law does not examine whether the models are 
representative of the real financial risk and/or whether they cause procyclicality. 
Therefore, some supplementary statistics like those reported above could be useful for 
examining how representative the VaR estimations are at the 99% c.l.. 
Taking into consideration the abovementioned, we tried to find a way to test whether 
the 750-day DNVaR model is the most accurate or the most conservative. An additional 
evaluation procedure at a confidence level lower than 99% may be a solution for more 
accurate and non procyclical VaR estimations (Vasileiou and Pantos (2018)). We 
examine the same models at the 95% c.l. which allows us to evaluate whether a model 
overestimates or underestimates the risk. The results are presented in the second sub-
Table A2 for the German case, and show that: (i) the 20-day DNVaR model is the most 
accurate amongst the examined models, because it is considered inaccurate only 1 out 
of the 17 years, and (ii) when overshootings are observed the deviations from the real 
losses are lower than those documented in the other models. The 750-day DNVaR 
model overestimates the risk in 6 out of the 17 years (2004, 2005, 2010, 2012, 2013 and 
2017) and underestimates the risk in 3 out of the 17 years (2002, 2008 and 2015) which 
are indications for procylicality and this is not in favor of the robustness of the financial 
system. Therefore, at the 95% c.l. the increased number of years that the 750-day 
DNVaR is considered inaccurate due to over-estimation reasons may be an indication 
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that the model at the 99% c.l. was the most accurate not because it representatively 
captures the financial risk, but because the specific model was conservative.  
Similar analysis could be done for the rest of the markets/cases we have examined in 
this study. All these findings are contemporary validations of Hendricks’ (1996) 
conclusions that 
• the conventional VaR models that use a recent/short-term observation period 
present an increased number of low deviated violations, which is true when we 
compare the short-length (=< 250 observations) versus the longer-observation 
(>250) models, but  
• the short-length VaR models are more representative of the real financial 
conditions than the long-VaR models, as the respective tables at the 95% c.l. 
show. The shorter-length models are considered as inaccurate significantly 
fewer times than the longer-observation CDNVaR models.        
 
4. Further discussion 
The empirical findings show some legislative deficiencies that need to be addressed in 
order to make the financial system stronger. The law can be easily amended in the 
following ways to achieve greater stability:  
a) the c.l. at 99% examines if the VaR underestimates the risk, but it does not 
examine if the VaR overestimates the risk; therefore an extra backtesting 
procedure at a lower c.l. could prove useful in order to resolve the specific issue 
that may lead to procyclicality. Moreover, some VaR statistics, similar to those 
reported in the lower shaded part in Table 1, can be used to test the reliability 
and representativeness of VaR models (especially at the 99% c.l.), and  
b) the limitation of 250 observations at least for the data inputs number does not 
offer something to the robustness of the financial system. On the contrary, it 
may lead to specific risk management practices that contribute to procyclical 
and conservative VaR estimations which meet the legal requirements but fail to 
accurately assess risk.   
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Many distinguished researchers stress that the financial markets overreact and that the 
economy is cyclical (Bernanke (1983), De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1990), Schwert 
(1989)). Several explanations have been proposed as to why this happens. This paper 
presents an alternative view based on a structural/legal justification of the possible 
reasons that could contribute to market overreaction and procyclicality. At points such 
as R (Figure 1), stock holders may bear increased risk, but the VaR estimations do not 
warn them. Consequently, when the crisis emerges, losses higher than those expected 
prompt stock holders to try to sell their positions and this may lead to sharp decline 
(overreactions). On the other hand, in points similar to G, when the stock market 
recovers, investors may not be able to bear increased risk because the VaR measures 
incorrectly predict higher risk and behavioral and/or legal restrictions7 may influence 
their decision. Such an investment behavior in points similar to R and G contributes to 
the market’s procyclicality, which is not a favorable factor for a robust financial system.  
The CESR (2010) presents similarities to the Basel Accords, because in most of the 
cases asset management legislation adopts the Basel requirements8. Therefore, it is 
worth mentioning that a consultation paper by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (2013, p. 3) has confirmed its intention to move from the VaR to Expected 
Shortfall (ES). The reason for this change according to this report is “A number of 
weaknesses have been identified with using VaR for determining regulatory capital 
requirements, including its inability to capture “tail risk””. Concerns about the adoption 
of VaR as the fundamental risk measure have long been raised, even from a theoretical 
perspective (see Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath (1999)) and the problem of risk 
underestimation/tail risk is not new. However, as Acerbi and Szekely (2014) note, the 
Basel Committee (BCBS (2013)) still uses the VaR as a backtesting measure for 
internal risk. 
Therefore, scholars and financial engineers should try to formulate easy to understand 
and easy to apply VaR models, which do not suffer so much from tail risk. The 
legislative framework should force investment companies to stop using risk 
management practices that are designed to avoid legal restrictions and instead to invest 
                                                          
7 Investments which are limited by an absolute VaR threshold (CESR 2010, p. 26) may not be able to 
bear increased risk during recovery because VaR at G point is increased.   
8 Recently a new legislative framework for Money Market Funds has been adopted, and ESMA mentions 
(2018), p.24) that the liquidity stress tests are based on Basel 3 Liquidity Coverage Ratio. 
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on VaR systems for accurate and representative risk estimation. Moreover, even if the 
VaR models are replaced by the ES models, when these models are backtested they 
should provide not only accurate but also representative risk estimations of the 
examined financial conditions. If the risk measures instantly capture the real risk, this 
will lead to a more effective and robust financial system, because panic will be 
reduced9. Furthermore, the VaR measures should be presented not only in the annual 
reports, but at least on a monthly basis in order to inform the investors of the risk they 
bear.  
5. Conclusions 
We highlight some deficiencies of the VaR legislative framework, and we propose that 
scholars, regulators, and researchers should find a way to turn VaR from a conventional 
and backward-looking statistical measure to a significant indicator for the stability of 
the financial market. Conventional VaR models not only fail to provide information for 
financial trend changes, but also contribute to such phenomena as 
procyclicalitycyclicity and overreaction in the stock market.  
Therefore, the legislative framework should force financial companies to use models 
that provide not only accurate but also representative VaR estimations. We suggest 
some simple interventions and additional tests that could contribute to this, such as: (a) 
detailed VaR statistics that show how representative the VaR estimations are, (b) an 
extra backtesting procedure at a confidence level lower than 99% that the law proposes, 
in order to show not only when the models under-estimate the risk, but also when the 
models over-estimate the risk, so as to reduce the procyclicality issue. Moreover, we 
provide empirical evidence that the legal guideline on input data which requires at least 
250 observations may not lead to more representative VaR estimations. As we 
presented, this limitation does not contribute to the stability of the financial system, and 
therefore it should be removed.  
The authorities should focus on the tradeoff between an increased number of 
overshootings that present lower deviations and a lower number of overshootings that 
present higher deviations. At the same time, scholars and financial engineers should 
                                                          
9 At it has been mentioned, if a VaR model significantly underestimates the risk i.e. VaR 1% and losses 
2.5%, this may lead to panic because the risk is not representative. After a crisis the VaR should not be 
overestimated in order not to panic the investors when the recovery period comes.  
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find easily applied and understood models that provide VaR estimations which are as 
accurate and as representative as those calculated by advanced VaR models.   
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